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Abstract—The paper presents a theoretical introduction to
the cryptographic hash function theory and a statistical
experimental analysis of selected hash functions. The def-
inition of hash functions, differences between them, their
strengths and weaknesses are explained as well. Different hash
function types, classes and parameters are described. The fea-
tures of hash functions are analyzed by performing statistical
analysis. Experimental analysis is performed for three cer-
tified hash functions: SHA1-160, SHA2-512 and SHA3-512.
Such an analysis helps understand the behavior of crypto-
graphic hash functions and may be very helpful for compar-
ing the security level of the hashing method selected. The tests
may serve as a basis for examination of each newly proposed
hash function. Additionally, the analysis may be harness as
a method for comparing future proposals with the existing
functions.
Keywords—cryptographic hash function, hashing metod, secu-
rity.
1. Introduction
As they play an important role in ensuring the security
and confidentiality of information, identification and au-
thentication methods are approached with an ever greater
attention, both in civilian (personal information, passwords,
PIN codes) and military domains. Hashing is one of the
techniques enabling to meet some of the demands described
above. Practical applications of cryptographic hash func-
tions include message integrity checking, digital signatures,
authentication procedures and other information security-
related applications.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe
the properties of one way functions, as well as the prop-
erties and classes of hash functions. In Section 3, methods
of creating hashing functions are presented. In Section 4,
the strengths and weaknesses of hashing functions certifi-
cated by NIST are presented. Section 5 is devoted to statis-
tical tests involving SHA1-160, SHA-512 and SHA3-512,
with their results described. Section 6 summarizes the work
and offers conclusions.
2. Hash Functions: Properties,
Classes and Types
Let us start with the definition of a one way function, which
is given below [1]:
∀x ∈ X , f : x → y∧¬(∃g : y → x) . (1)
It means that for all function arguments x there exist
a value y, but it is impossible to identify a function which
will assume this value y as an argument and return x. Hash
functions belong to family of one way functions, but are
bound by an additional restriction. Formally, they are de-
fined as follows [2]:
h : {0,1}∗→ {0,1}n,n ≥ 1 , (2)
where {0,1}∗ is an input set (formally its elements may be
of any length), and will be further denoted by M. Elements
from M will be denoted by m (m ∈ M). {0,1}n is an set
of output hashes, each with a fixed length and a finite
number of combinations, and will be further denoted by
H (note, that n is greater than or equal to 1) [2]. Hashes
from H will be denoted by h(m) (h(m) ∈ H).
In article [3] Carter and Wegman presented three basic hash
function classes.
2.1. Universal Hash Functions Classes
Class H1 is designated for computers which are capable of
fast multiplication of the input bit string. Hashes from this
class may become inconvenient when the input bit string
is too long to multiply it in a single machine instruction.
The basic formula of hashes from this group is: for 2 ele-
ments, let us call them m and n, the hash is calculated as
follows [3]:
hm,n(x) = (mx+n) mod p . (3)
In class H3, only simple linear transformations are used
instead of multiplication. Formally, the class is defined
as follows: if the hash function transforms elements from
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set A (each element is a binary number with length i) to
set B (each element is a binary number with length j),
M is an array of size i and contains elements from B, and
m are elements of M (m∈ M) where m(k) is the k-th bit of
element m, then for any x ∈ A (with the same bit indexing
as m), the hash function is represented by [3]:
hm(x) = x1m(1)⊕ x2m(2)⊕·· ·⊕ xim(i). (4)
Then H3 is a set defined in the following manner [3]:
{ fm : m ∈ M} . (5)
Class H2 is very similar to class H3. The difference is
that hashing functions from this class require more space
for hash computation, but need less time. The key point
is to find a function g which maps an input bit string into
a longer input bit stream containing fewer less ‘1s’. Then,
H2 can be defined [3]:
{ f ∗g : f ∈ H3} . (6)
To define when a set of hashing functions becomes uni-
versal, we have to introduce a certain notation. Let us
consider hash function h which maps set A into set B. It
is always assumed that |A| > |B|. Then, it is possible to
define function δh in the following manner [3]:
δh(x,y) =
{
1 if x 6= y and h(x) = h(y)
0 otherwise , (7)
where x,y ∈ A. We can say that collection of hashing func-
tions C is universal when for all x and y in A δC(x,y) ≤
|C|
|B| [3]. In practice, this means that no pair of distinct in-
puts from A collides under more than ( 1|B|)−th of the func-
tions [3]. All three classes (H1, H2, and H3) are universal,
but H2 and H3 classes are the most popular ones [3].
2.2. Hash Function Types
Cryptographic hash functions may be divided into two
groups [2]:
• keyed hash functions – require a secret key and are
known as message authentication code (MAC) [2],
• un-keyed hash functions – do not require any secret
key and may be referred to as manipulation detection
code (MDC).
Generally, the term hash functions refer to un-keyed
hash functions [2].
In this paper, we will focus on un-keyed hash functions
which can be divided into three subgroups, based on their
additional properties:
1. One way hash functions (OWHF) – defined by
Merkle [4] and fulfilling the following requirements:
• hash function does not give any constraint on
input data size,
• output hash has constant length,
• output hash should be easy to compute,
• “given h and h(x), it is computationally infea-
sible to determine x” – a preimage resistance
feature,
• “given h and x, it is computationally infeasible
to find an x′ 6= x such feature that h(x) = h(x′)”
– the second preimage resistance.
2. Collision resistant hash functions (CRHF) – belong-
ing to the OWHF group and fulfilling an addi-
tional requirement: it is impossible to find a pair
(x,x′) where x 6= x′, which have the same hash value
(h(x) = h(x′)). This condition is known as collision
resistance. The difference between the second preim-
age resistance depends on the selection of arguments.
In the second preimage resistance condition, the at-
tacker has a given value x and has to find x′. In the
collision resistance condition, the selection of both:
x and x′ is a free choice of the attacker.
3. Universal one way hash functions – a family in which
the probability of finding a second preimage for a ran-
domly chosen hash function is negligible [2], [5].
These functions are faster than CRHF and allow
to omit trapdoors during digital signature creation.
They are used when it is impossible to make a de-
cision in which the hash function should be chosen
before computation starts.
3. MDC Construction Method
3.1. Hash Function Based on Block Ciphers
To describe the general concept of creation of hash func-
tions based on block ciphers, the following set have to be
defined [6], [7]:
S ∈ {Mi,Mi XOR Xi,Xi,C} , (8)
where Mi is one block of a message, Xi is a chaining value
from the previous step and C is a chosen constant value [7].
Note that all these values are given for i-th round of hash
computation, and that secure block cipher B was already
chosen. Then the construction of i-th round is:
1. Choose a private key P for B from set S.
2. Choose an input I from set S.
3. Pass I and P to the algorithm B and calculate cipher
value CV .
4. Choose value T from set S.
5. Calculate Xi+1 = T ⊕CV .
6. Update set S with values Xi+1 and Mi+1 (next block
of message) according to the formula (8). If it is
impossible, computation ends.
7. Go to step 1.
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The selection of variables depends on the algorithm design,
but at least one variable should be Mi. The output hash
should be as big as block size of B, or twice as big [6].
This is caused by the small size (mainly 64 bits) of the
block. Hash should be bigger to avoid collisions. The
speed of hash functions based on block ciphers is equal to
the number of encryptions to process r plaintext bits, where
r is defined as block size [6].
Most hash functions constructed in this way suffer from nu-
merous security vulnerabilities [7] and cannot be used in
practice. However, an opposite situation may occur when
the block cipher construction is based on the hash func-
tion, for example in SHACAL and SHACAL-2, with both
being based on the SHA-1 cryptographic hash function [2].
A good example of a hash function with its length equal
to the size of the block is described by Meyer and Oseas
in [8]. More examples may be found in [6].
3.2. Hash Functions Based on Cellular Automata
Cellular automata (CA) can be used for ciphers generations
and for hash functions design [7], since Wolfram [9] de-
veloped a pseudorandom generator based on CA rule 30.
Cellhas, as described in [10], is a good example of a hash-
ing function based on CA.
3.3. Hash Functions Based on Math
There are three ways of creating of hashing functions based
on mathematical constructions:
1. Hashing function based on mathematical primitives
is based on modular arithmetic, discrete logarithm
problem and factorization problem [11].
• Factorization problem is based on the difficulty
of finding two factors, for any positive integer,
which, when multiplied, will give these inte-
gers. This problem can be also described by
the following formula: for a given integer I it
is hard to find a and b such that ab = I.
• Discrete logarithm problem, such as that for a
given abelian group O, generator of this group o
and an element e which belongs to O, finding (if
it is possible) x such that ox = e. The difficulty
of the discrete logarithm problem depends on
group O.
2. Hashing function based on Knapsack NP-complete
problem. From a cryptographic point of view its
formula may be formulated as [6]:
n
∑
i=1
ai · xi = S , (9)
where each ai is a m bit integers: {a1,a2, . . . ,an},
S is a p bit integer and p ≈ m + log2 n, and X is a
vector of elements xi ∈ {0,1}, [6], [7] and [11].
3. Hashing function based on algebraic matrices, de-
veloped by Harari [12]. Here, the key K is a n× n
random matrix and M is the 1× n message ma-
trix. Then the digest D is: MT KM or equivalently
KT MK [7], [12]:
D = MT KM. (10)
or
D = KT MK. (11)
Unfortunately, collisions appeared in the Harari hash
function proposition [7].
3.4. Dedicated Hash Functions
Dedicated hash functions created only for hashing opera-
tion. Their security can be proved mainly in an empiri-
cal way, because they very often do not base on any hard
problem, like factorization or discrete logarithm problem.
Examples are MD4, MD5, SHA1, SHA2 or SHA3. Based
on them algorithms were designed to be as fast as possible
in software implementations rather than hardware [11].
3.5. Standardization of Hashing Functions
After the first collision for MD5 was discovered, the Na-
tional Institute of Standard and Technology, USA, created
a hashing standard – Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA). The
first version of SHA, known as SHA-0, was published in
1993. In 1995 SHA-0 was replaced by a new version –
SHA-1. In 2005 vulnerabilities were identified in SHA-1
and NIST introduced SHA-2, which is used currently. In
2007 an open competition for the next generation SHA-3
was announced. The evaluation criteria are as follows [13]:
• applications of the hash functions – the wider va-
riety of cryptographic usage, the better. The new
standard should be useful for the creation of hashed
message authentication code (HMAC), as well as for
the creation of digital signatures or random bit gen-
erators [14].
• specific requirements when hash functions are used
to support HMAC, pseudo-random functions (PRFs),
or randomized hashing – each algorithm had to have
at least one scheme to support HMAC as PRFs [14].
These PRFs have to be secure against known attacks
which require less than 2
n
2 queries or which require
less computation then the preimage attack [14]. If the
hashing function is capable of randomized hashing, it
has to have n security bits against attacks mentioned
in [14].
• additional security requirements of hash functions –
for a digest with size n: n2 bits of collision resistance,
n bits of preimage resistance and n−k bits second
preimage resistance for any message shorter than 2k
bits [14]. All these rules should be fulfilled with
m replacing n for any m size subset taken from the
digest [14].
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• evaluation of attack resistance- hashing functions
were attacked with well-known and popular meth-
ods discovered during the security evaluation phase.
Other validation methods were based on statistical
and behavioral tests, such randomness of hash cre-
ation [14].
• other consideration factors – for example quality of
security proofs, proper analysis, documentation and
simplicity of the algorithm, as well as opinions by
NIST and the cryptographic community.
The remaining criteria included speed of the algorithm,
code size, memory and hardware implementation require-
ments, flexibility and simplicity [13]. The final report an-
nouncing the winner (the Keccak algorithm) was published
in 2012 [15].
4. Theoretical Analysis of Security
Parameters
In this section, we will present the results of an analysis of
the dependence between the length of the digested messages
and the security parameters of hashing functions.
The security level of a cryptographic primitive is expressed
in bits, where n-bit security means that the attacker would
have to perform 2n operations to break it. The security level
of a cryptographic hash function has been defined using the
following properties:
• collision resistance bits of security,
• preimage attacks bits of security,
• second preimage resistance bits of security.
To compromise collision resistance using the brute force
method, the attacker needs to hash a huge number of
variants of the message m, and hash a huge number of
variants m′, go through the lists and see if there are values
that are equal. For example, in a 160-bit hash output, the
attacker needs 280 inputs to test in both lists. Therefore, in
the case of this hash function, the number of bits of secu-
rity against this attack is equal to 80, due to the Birthday
Paradox.
While breaking preimage and second preimage resis-
tance, the attacker cannot apply the Birthday Paradox. For
a mbox160-bit hash output, the attacker needs to examine
2160 input messages, which means that 160 bits of security
are achieved.
In Table 1, security parameters of selected hashing func-
tions, as accepted by NIST, are presented [16]. In Table 1,
function L(M) is defined as:
L(M) =
⌈
log2
len(M)
B
⌉
. (12)
where M is the input message, B is the block size of the
hash function and d.e denotes the least integer not strictly
lower than the argument in the brackets.
Table 1
NIST-approved security parameters of hash functions
Bits of security
Function
Output
Collision
Pre- Second
size image preimage
SHA-1 160 < 80 160 160-L(M)
SHA-224 224 112 224 min [224, 256-L(M)]
SHA-256 256 128 256 256-L(M)
SHA-384 384 192 384 384
SHA-512 512 256 512 512-L(M)
SHA3-224 224 112 224 224
SHA3-256 256 128 256 256
SHA3-384 384 192 384 384
SHA3-512 512 256 512 512
Using the brute force method, there always exists a generic
attack comprising 2
n
2 , 2n and 2n steps, respectively, where
n is the hash length [17]. This is the maximum (ideal) se-
curity level which can be achieved for any hash function.
As it can be seen in Table 1, SHA-1 has a lower-than-
ideal security level in terms of collision attacks and second
preimage attacks. SHA-1 offers the maximum potential
strength in terms of second preimage attacks, when the
message size (in bits) is up to 160. With bigger message
sizes, Eq. (12) is growing up to 1 (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. SHA-160 second preimage attack bits of security.
Fig. 2. SHA-256 second preimage attack bits of security.
The SHA-2 family is collision resistant but in every case
(except for SHA-384), the security bit parameter of the
second preimage attack cannot be ideal when the length
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of M is greater than the block size B. Dependencies be-
tween the number of bits of security and the message length
for SHA-256 and SHA-512 are presented in Figs. 2 and 3.
For SHA-256, resistance to second preimage attacks is not
perfect when the message size is over 256 bits. the max-
imum message size was measured in the same way as in
the case of SHA-1.
Fig. 3. SHA-512 second preimage attack bits of security.
Fig. 4. SHA-224 second preimage attack bits of security.
The case of SHA-512 is similar to that of SHA-256, but
this time the maximum secure message size is 512 bits. It
is so because Eq. (12) is greater than or equal to 1 only
when log2
len(M)
B is greater than 0. log2
len(M)
B is greater
than 0 only when the message length is greater than the
block size. SHA-224 is different than its predecessors. As
can be seen in Fig. 4 the dependence between the number
of bits of security and the message size is constant, but ac-
cording to NIST (Table 1), SHA-224 is not totally resistant
against second preimage attacks. This is because the secu-
rity bits are defined in this case by min[224, 256−L(M)].
A vulnerability appears when L(M) = 33 (56−33 = 223).
This situation may occur when
⌈
len(M)
512
⌉
= 233. Thus, len(M)512
should be in the range of (233−1, 233). len(M)512 = 2
33−1
when len(M) = 4398046510592 bits. It means that SHA-
224 becomes insecure against second preimage attacks
when the size of M is about 512 GB.
The SHA3 function family currently offers perfect security
against all three attacks: collision, preimage and second
preimage.
5. Experimental Analysis for Selected
NIST Hash Functions
For statistical analysis, we have chosen the strongest (the
longest) hash function from the SHA1, SHA2 and SHA3
families, i.e. SHA-512, SHA3-512 and SHA1-160, respec-
tively. A data sample consisting of 10,000 messages was
considered. All tests were implemented in the JAVA pro-
gramming language (JDK 1.8) and hashes were generated
with the use of the Bouncy Castle library [18].
All 10000 random messages were binary strings. Each
input had the same length as the output digest size (160 bit
inputs for SHA1 function and 512 bit inputs for SHA-512
and SHA3-512 functions). All input data was generated
one by one, separately for SHA1, SHA-512 and SHA3-
512, with the use of SecureRandom Java class [19].
By hashing those inputs, we have received the same number
pairs: (input, digest) for every hash function.
Three statistical tests were performed: hamming distance
test, bits probability test and series test. The details, results,
conclusions and comparisons are described in the following
subsections.
5.1. Hamming Distance Test
The idea of this test was to measure how small (or even
micro) changes in input data influence the output hash.
Hash function is passing the test when the statistic |Z| from
T-Student test (13) is within the (0,1.96) interval. The ex-
pected value is equal to Hashsize2 (50%). Significance level
α was set to 5%. The T-Student formula is:
|Z|=
∣∣∣∣Average value−Expected valueStandard deviation
√
Sample size
∣∣∣∣. (13)
Firstly, we generated, for each of the pairs (input,hash),
another pair (input ′, hash′), where input ′ was the original
input with one random bit changed to the opposite (1 into 0
or 0 into 1), and hash′ was a digest calculated from input′.
We have received two very similar inputs and two hashes.
The aim of the experiment was to measure the Hamming
distance [20] between these hashes and to repeat this pro-
cedure for all inputs generated and for all hashing functions
chosen. The hamming distance may be defined as follows.
If S1 is the first bit string, S2 is the second bit string and
len(S1) = len(S2), the Hamming distance between S1 and
S2 is the number of 1s in the string S3 = S1⊕ S2. It is
the number of positions in which S1 have different values
than S2, which can be interpreted as the distance between
S1 and S2.
Results of the experiment for the SHA1 hashing function
are presented in Fig. 5 and in Table 2. The horizontal black
line is set to 80 because it is the expected value (distance).
4673 out of 10, 000 values were over the black line, but
the score is close to 50%. The critical values presented in
Table 2 indicate that the average is almost 50%. The |Z|
statistic was equal to 1.17, so the T-Student test had been
passed. The conclusion is that micro changes in input data
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Fig. 5. SHA1 Hamming distance test.
make SHA1 hashes at least 50% different, so the Hamming
distance test has been passed.
Results of the experiment for the SHA-512 hashing function
are presented in Fig. 6 and Table 2.
Fig. 6. SHA-512 Hamming distance test.
Table 2
Comparison of Hamming distance critical values
Hamming distance [% values]
Function Max Min AVG SD
SHA-1 66.25 33.75 50.04 ±4.02
SHA-512 58.40 41.41 50.00 ±2.21
SHA3-512 59.38 41.99 50.00 ±2.22
The black line is equal to 256, because it is the expected
value (distance). In 4836 out of 10,000 cases, the dif-
ference between hashes was lower than 50%, but in some
case it was also close to 50%. The average distance be-
tween hash and hash′ is equal to 50% and the |Z| value
Fig. 7. SHA3-512 Hamming distance test.
was 0.148. T-Student test was also passed, but the score
achieved was much better than in the SHA1 case. SHA-512
has also passed the Hamming distance test.
The research results for SHA3-512 hashing function are
presented in Fig. 7 and in Table 2.
The black line is equal to 256, because it is the expected
value. In 4799 out of 10,000 cases, the difference between
hashes was lower than 50%. The critical values are very
similar to SHA-512 (average, standard deviation). |Z| statis-
tic was equal to 0.44, thus SHA3-512 has also passed the
Hamming distance test.
All three hashing functions passed the Hamming distance
test, however, statistically, the SHA-512 is the best, SHA3-
512 ranks second and SHA1 ranks third.
5.2. Bits Probability Test
This time, the aim was to check whether bits in the digest
may be predicted or not. To measure it, we had to estimate
the probability of 1s in every bit position. The ideal situa-
tion is when every bit has a 50% probability of being a 1,
and a 50% probability of being a 0:
P1(i) = 50%, i = 1, . . . , l , (14)
where i denotes the bit position and l is the hash length. For
each hashing function, we used 10,000 generated digests to
estimate the probability of ‘1’:
P1(i) =
10000
∑
j=1
hashes[ j][i]
10000
, i = 1, . . . , l , (15)
where hashes is a table of generated digests, j denotes j-th
hash from hashes. We used Eq. (13) to calculate the |Z|
statistic. The test is passed when |Z| < 1.96 (significance
level of α = 5%). The expected value is 50%.
Results of the experiment for the SHA1 hashing function
are presented in Fig. (8) and in Table 3.
Fig. 8. SHA1 bits prediction.
As one can see, the average value is very close to 50% and
the standard deviation is low. Despite the fact that none
of the bits have the probability that is equal to 50%, the
fluctuations are very small. The |Z| statistic is equal to 1.04,
so the conclusion is that none of 160 SHA1 bits can be
predicted.
130
Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Cryptographic Hash Functions
Table 3
Comparison of bits prediction test values
Probability of 1
Function Max Min AVG SD
SHA1 51.35 48.20 50.04 ±0.52
SHA-512 51.46 48.49 49.99 ±0.53
SHA3-512 51.74 48.76 49.99 ±0.51
Results of the test for the SHA-512 hashing function are
presented in Table 3 and in Fig. 9.
Fig. 9. SHA-512 bits prediction.
Performance of SHA-512 is a similar to that of SHA1 in the
context of bits prediction. 510 of the bits have a P1(i) value
that is different than 50%. However, despite small fluctua-
tions, the average value and |Z| equal to 0.863 clearly prove
that none of the 512 bits of SHA-512 can be predicted.
Results of the experiment results for the SHA3-512 hashing
function are presented in Table 3 and in Fig. 10.
Fig. 10. SHA3-512 bits prediction.
The results for SHA3-512 are similar to those for SHA-512.
506 out of 512 bits fail to satisfy P1(i) = 50%, but the dif-
ferences are small. |Z| is equal to 0.317, so the conclusion
is that none of 512 bits of the SHA3-512 hashing function
may be predicted.
All tested functions pass the bits probability test. This
test shows that in every bit position its value is random
(ones and zeroes are equally probable). The best score
was achieved by SHA3-512, SHA-512 ranked second and
SHA1 third.
5.3. Series Test
This test allows to measure whether all hashes were gener-
ated in a random manner. Previously, in the bits prediction
test, we considered each bit of digest separately, but in the
context of all generated hashes. This time the existence of
internal dependencies of each hash of each chosen hash-
ing function was measured. To do this, we performed the
Wald-Wolfowitz series test [21].
This measure is the subsequence taken from a sequence
consisting of the same values only (0 or 1). The number of
all series found in one hash will be further denoted by R.
n1 is the number of subsequences consisting only of 1s, and
n0 is the number of subsequences consisting only of 0s.
For example, in the 00101101 sequence, the parameters
are: R = 6, n1 = 3 and n0 = 3. The null hypothesis H0
claims that the investigated sequence (in this case digest) is
random. The alternative hypothesis Ha claims that the in-
vestigated sequence was not produced in a random manner.
To decide whether H0 is true or not, a proper test statis-
tic value has to be calculated. Because every generated
hash has n0 > 20 and n1 > 20, test statistics tend to have
normal distribution N(0,1) (when H0 is true) and will be
denoted by Z. Test statistic Z for each hash was calculated
from [21]:
Z =
R−R
SD
, (16)
where R is the expected number of all series, such as:
R =
2n0n1
n0 +n1
+1 , (17)
and SD is the standard deviation:
SD =
√
2n0n1(2n0n1−n0−n1)
(n0 +n1)2(n0 +n1−1)
. (18)
We have chosen significance level of α = 5%. Thus when
|Z| > Z0.975 the H0 is true and the hash investigated was
created randomly. Parameter Z0.975 is equal to 1.96.
Results of the experiment for the SHA1 hashing function
are presented in Table 4 and Fig. 11.
Table 4
Comparison of series test critical values
Z statistic values
Function Max Min AVG SD
SHA1 4.23 0˜ 0.79 ±0.60
SHA-512 4.04 0˜ 0.80 ±0.61
SHA3-512 4.39 0˜ 0.79 ±0.59
The black horizontal line is indicating Z = 1.96 (α = 5%).
The average value and the standard deviation show that,
generally, SHA1 passes the series test, but one may notice
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Fig. 11. SHA1 series test.
in the chart that definitely not all digests do so. 480 out of
10,000 samples (4.8%) are considered to have failed.
Results of the test for the SHA-512 hashing function are
presented in Table 4 and Fig. 12.
Fig. 12. SHA-512 series test.
In the case of SHA-512, the test was failed in the case of
498 out of 10,000 samples (4.98%). The value is higher
than in the case of SHA1 and SHA3-512. The average Z
value is the highest, however it is still far from the critical
region. We can say that SHA-512 passes the series test
with the worst results achieved.
Research results for the SHA3-512 hashing function are
shown in Table 4 and Fig. 13.
Fig. 13. SHA3-512 series test.
In contrast to SHA-512, SHA3-512 achieved the best test
results. Only 417 out of 10,000 samples failed (4.17%),
which is the lowest value among all hashing functions
tested. The average Z value is also closest to 0. SHA3-512
definitely passes the test.
All three hashing functions have passed our last test. The
best score was achieved by SHA3-512 and the worst by
SHA-512. In all cases, the test was not passed by less than
5% of samples, so it may be stated that, statistically (with
a significance level set to 5%), all hashes were generated
randomly.
6. Summary
The aim of this paper was to describe the types, classes
and main characteristics of cryptographic hash functions.
The formal definition of a hash function was presented and
universal hash function classes were described. Then, sev-
eral methods for the construction of hash functions were
disclosed. Standardization procedures for hash functions,
as drawn up by NIST, USA, finalize the theoretical part of
this paper.
In the research-related sections, we provided an analysis on
the influence of the hashed message length on the theoret-
ical security of hash functions, described as the number of
bits of security.
The paper describes numerous experiments evaluating the
basic features of SHA1, SHA-512 and SHA3-512. The
randomness of such functions in terms of input spreading,
single bit prediction ability and randomness inside each
single bit output, were illustrated. Three tests were per-
formed. The first was based on the Hamming distance
measurement, the second examined the frequency of zeros
and ones in a large sample, and the third was a series test.
Numerous experiments proved that the features of certified
hash functions differ, but they all offer very good character-
istics in terms of collision resistance, preimage resistance
and second preimage resistance attacks.
The analysis provided may be very useful for testing new
or proprietary hash functions.
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